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First Japan and more recently China have pursued export-oriented growth strategies. While other Asian countries have done likewise, Japan and China are of particular interest because their economies are so large and the size of the associated bilateral trade imbalances with the United States so conspicuous. In this paper the authors focus on U.S. efforts to restore the reciprocal GATT/WTO market-access bargain in the face of such large imbalances and the significant spillovers to the international trading system. The paper highlights similarities and differences in the two cases. The This paper-a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to understand research issues associated with market access. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at cbown@worldbank.org. authors describe U.S. attempts to reduce the bilateral imbalances through targeted trade policies intended to slow growth of U.S. imports from these countries or increase growth of U.S. exports to them. They then examine how these trade policy responses, as well as U.S. efforts to address what were perceived as underlying causes of the imbalances, influenced the evolution of the international trading system. Finally, the authors compare the macroeconomic conditions associated with the bilateral trade imbalances and their implications for the conclusions of the two episodes.
Introduction
Japan in the 1950s through the 1990s and China since the late 1970s have followed similarand similarly successful-strategies of promoting economic growth through rapid acquisition of advanced foreign technology and expansion of manufactured exports. While other Asian countries have done likewise, in some cases with exports growing as rapidly and for as long, Japan and China have presented special challenges to the GATT/WTO trading system because their shares of world exports have been so large and the associated bilateral trade imbalances with the United States so conspicuous. In both political and economic terms, these large imbalances seem to contradict the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity, which involves a balance of market-access concessions across major players in the system.
During their respective periods of rapid export growth, Japan and China each accounted for a major share of total world exports. As of 2007, China's share of world merchandise exports had soared to 8.9%, less than Germany's 9.7% share but topping the U.S. share of 8.5% as well as Japan's 5.2%, in each of the latter three cases from a much larger economy (WTO 2008b) Unlike the principles of most favored nation treatment (Article I) and national treatment (Article III), there is no "Article" of the GATT 1947 clearly identifying reciprocity as a GATT principle. However, the Articles that govern how countries renegotiate concessions-in particular Articles XXVIII and XIX-do contain explicit language about reciprocity, and the GATT/WTO practice of reciprocity has typically resulted in a balance of market-opening concessions across the major players in the system. 2 But if a large economy such as Japan or
China pursues an export-led growth strategy, the resulting increase in exports disturbs the initial "balance of concessions," i.e., the reciprocal market-access outcome. The major trading partners that receive the increased exports may then seek ways to rebalance the bargain.
bilateral imbalance episode in the 1990s, and may also speak to the resolution of the U.S.-China bilateral imbalance. Section 7 concludes.
Our purpose in the paper is to describe actions taken by the United States and interpret them in terms of the role played by reciprocity in theories of the GATT/WTO as a self-enforcing agreement. The paper is thus intended to be descriptive and analytical, not normative. While we characterize certain U.S. policies as "targeting" Japanese or Chinese exports, we do not attempt a systematic evaluation either of the effectiveness of these policies in achieving their objectives or their consistency with national laws and international agreements. Likewise, we do not attempt a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of Japanese and Chinese industrial and macroeconomic policies in promoting economic growth or their conformity with international agreements.
U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China: Similarities and differences in the two episodes
There are striking parallels and also important differences between the U.S.-Japan frictions that peaked in the mid-1980s and the more recent U.S.-China frictions that began in the late 1990s.
The most salient common element is the huge size of the bilateral trade imbalances. To many, the imbalances themselves are convincing evidence of unfair trading practices. 4 In both cases, a large bilateral trade deficit has been linked in the public mind to the steady decline in the share of manufacturing in total U.S. employment. Also similar are the allegations that the extraordinary export growth has been sustained by factors such as government subsidies and persistent currency undervaluation, rather than-or at least in addition to-comparative advantage. Both countries prevented currency appreciation, especially relative to the U.S.
dollar, through accumulation of dollar-denominated government securities. 5 Both countries also 4 Although the link has wide acceptance among U.S. policy makers and the public, economic analysis indicates that bilateral imbalances have no particular significance in a multi-country world; free trade based on comparative advantage would be expected to produce trade surpluses with some partners and trade deficits with others. Moreover, as we discuss in section 6 below, an overall external imbalance cannot exist without a corresponding imbalance between domestic saving and domestic investment spending.
5 Corden (1981) advances an analysis of exchange-rate protection of the entire tradables sector through currency undervaluation. Unlike the use of trade policies to favor exports or restrict competing imports selectively, undervaluation does not create distortions within the tradables sector as a whole. Recent empirical research shows that currency undervaluation is associated with export surges and higher GDP growth, especially for developing countries (Freund and Pierola, 2008; Rodrik, 2008) . Rodrik suggests that an undervalued exchange rate may offset an informational market failure that would otherwise prevent firms in developing countries from identifying potential export products or markets. However, Staiger and Sykes (2008) use a theoretical analysis to show that the effects of exchange-rate undervaluation are complex and depend on a variety of underlying conditions; in some cases, exchangerate intervention would have no real effects. Given the complex relationship between exchange practices and trade volumes, Staiger and Sykes are doubtful that China's exchange-rate policies constitute a violation of its WTO commitments, i.e., by acting as an across-the-board export subsidy.
channeled capital to preferred sectors through the banking system, in both cases eventually resulting in an overhang of bad loans that complicated efforts to improve capital-market efficiency. 6 Table 1 Saxonhouse (1983) , Japan's industrial policy in the 1970s should be viewed as a means to overcome distortions resulting from the country's poorly functioning capital market. China uses industrial policy tools including taxation, indicative lending, and input pricing to provide firms with incentives intended to achieve desired modifications in the composition of economic activity (Bergsten et al., 2008; USITC 2007, Chapter 2) . China categorizes its industries as "encouraged," "restricted," or "to be eliminated," with these classifications subject to frequent revision, and structures incentives accordingly.
Although an ongoing goal of Chinese industrial policy is to facilitate movement from a planned to a market economy, firms owned entirely or in part by government units continue to play a major role in the economy. 7 Following World War II, U.S. participation in FDI was almost entirely as a home base for outward investments. Inward FDI began to take off in the 1970s, and by the mid-1980s the United States had become the world's largest host to inward FDI. CFIUS, an interagency committee chaired by the Treasury Secretary, was intended to address public and official concern regarding foreign control over U.S. economic activity.
8 Congress passed the Exon-Florio amendment ( §721 of the Defense Production Act) during a period of growing concern about foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets.
(CNOOC) in 2005. In contrast, greenfield investments, notably foreign-owned auto assembly plants, have been assiduously courted.
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Along with these striking similarities, there are also fundamental differences between the two cases. Most important, Japan was already an established industrial nation in the 1980s. By the mid-1980s, Japan's per capita income was above that of most European nations; enrollment rates for secondary and higher education were likewise comparable to those of the richest nations (World Development Report 1986) . In contrast, China is still poor, at least in terms of per capita income (around $3,000 in 2007), despite a prolonged period of stellar growth performance. 10 Thus, it is not surprising that earlier trade frictions between Japan and the United States focused mainly on direct competition, i.e., Japan's increasing share of the U.S.
market and its displacement of U.S. exports in third-country markets. Moreover, as a wealthy country, Japan consumed many of the same types of goods and services produced by the United States but imported too few of those from the United States-at least in the view of U.S.
producers and policy makers.
Given China's much lower per capita income, only a small fraction of Chinese consumers can yet afford the products that represent U.S. comparative advantage, i.e., those supplied by intellectual-property-intensive industries (films, music, software, pharmaceuticals), when sold at prices that reflect full enforcement of U.S. intellectual property rights. Moreover, Chinese consumers' desire to acquire such goods at affordable prices feeds the demand for pirated and copycat goods produced locally, thereby adding to U.S. complaints regarding China's lax enforcement of intellectual property rights. But this consumption pattern also implies that China's continued growth may help to increase still further the country's already large imports from the United States.
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As a reflection of the large differences in relative factor abundance and productivity between the United States and Japan, direct competition with China has been an important issue for only a few U.S. industries, mainly for labor-intensive "sunset" industries like apparel.
Rather, China has displaced other established trading partners in supplying the U.S. market. As Figure 1 illustrates, China's share of the total U.S. trade deficit has largely replaced the share of 9 The 1981 U.S. VERs limiting auto imports from Japan encouraged Japanese companies to move their factories to the United States. Between 1984 and 1987, seven Japanese companies built U.S. assembly plants. These were financed in large part by the abnormally high profits resulting from the VERs. By increasing supply to the U.S. market, the Japanese investments reduced profits of both Japanese and U.S. auto makers (De Melo and Tarr, 1991) . 10 Per capita income and other national averages mask large differences between the coastal areas and the interior provinces in the north and west of the country.
11 As of 2008, China was already the third largest market for U.S. merchandise exports, although a large share of those exports consisted of agricultural products and raw materials. While Japan and China both achieved rapid productivity improvement through 12 We follow common practice in expressing national and regional bilateral imbalances as shares or fractions of the overall U.S. imbalance. Note, however, that some U.S. bilateral balances are positive. Moreover, this presentation may suggest that movements in individual bilateral balances are determined independently, while in fact they can be linked causally. In particular, the reduction over time in the shares of Japan and other East Asian countries reflects relocation via direct foreign investment of processing activities to China. In part due to the "success" of agreements on textiles (which promoted growth of exports from other, not yet restricted, countries in Asia and elsewhere) and as Japan made a full recovery from the effects of World War II, Japan's exports and U.S.-Japan trade frictions shifted toward a succession of more sophisticated products. For many products, rapid export growth resulted first in a U.S. safeguard (Section 201) petition requesting relief from surging imports for an injured domestic industry and then a negotiated VER. Table 2 gives examples of U.S.
safeguard investigations resulting in such OMAs during the 1970s and 1980s in Japanese export products such as footwear, steel, television receivers, and even autos.
As Table 2 indicates, the safeguard law was not the only import-restricting policy that allowed U.S. industries to seek new trade barriers and that ultimately resulted in bilaterally negotiated VERs limiting Japanese exports to the United States. 22 U.S. antidumping policy, which we discuss in more detail in section 3.2 below, also resulted in a number of Japanese
VERs. The most important of these was the semiconductor VER, negotiated after a pair of antidumping petitions filed in 1985.
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A 1993 petition under the U.S. antidumping law also resulted in a VER over photo paper between the U.S. firm Kodak and the Japanese firm Fuji;
this dispute was a precursor to a high-profile WTO dispute between Kodak and Fuji. A 1996
antidumping petition over sodium azide resulted in a negotiated VER with three Japanese chemical-producing firms.
China: VERs in textiles and apparel, 2005-2008
The terms (Hufbauer and Elliott 1994, 91) . Voluntary restraints on flat-rolled steel products had been negotiated in 1985 (Hufbauer and Elliott 1994, 103) . 23 In July 1985, Micron filed an antidumping petition over 64K DRAMS that led to the imposition of duties on imports from Japanese firms Hitachi, Mitsubishi, NEC, and Oki Electric. The duty order on 64K DRAMS remained in place until 1993. In October 1985, U.S. firms Advanced Micro Devices, Intel, and National Semiconductor filed a separate petition over EPROMS, and in December 1985 the U.S. government self-initiated a petition over 256K and above DRAMS. The petitions led to negotiated VERs ("Suspension Agreements" in the language of U.S. antidumping) by which Japanese firms Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, and Tokyo Shibaura (Toshiba) agreed to limit exports to the U.S. market. The 256K DRAM suspension agreement was revoked in 1991, but the EPROM agreement was not formally revoked until 1997. Additional detailed data on each of these antidumping cases has been compiled in Bown (2009a 
U.S. antidumping against Japan and China
Antidumping ( On the economic effects of the end of the MFA, see Brambilla, Khandelwal, and Schott (forthcoming) and Barrows and Harrigan (2009) . 25 Under the self-enforcing WTO system, the United States and China were free to choose this option as long as no country filed a complaint. The WTO's Trade Policy Review of China (WTO 2006, 60-61) describes the VER settlements between the U.S. and China (as well as a similar arrangement between the EC and China):
"On 10 June 2005, China and the European Communities signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), placing export restraints on ten categories of Chinese textiles and clothing exports to the EC until 31 December 2007. The growth rates of these exports would be limited to between 8 percent and 12.5 percent per year. As a quid pro quo, the EC agreed to end its ongoing safeguard investigation on these products and to refrain from adopting measures as permitted under Article 242 of China's WTO Working Party Report, in categories not covered by the MOU…Under the Interim Measures, MOFCOM compiles a "Catalogue of Textiles Products Subject to Interim Export Administration", including exports of textiles and clothing subject to restrictions imposed by countries or regions unilaterally, and textile exports subject to temporary quantitative control under bilateral agreements. For each product listed in the Catalogue, the quota is partly assigned through a bidding system, and partly allocated based on the exporter's share in China's total export value for the previous year in the respective categories. 
Countervailing duties and country-specific safeguards
In the context of the differential response in U.S. treatment of Japan and China, two additional policies of contingent protection are countervailing duties and country-specific safeguards.
First, under the U.S. countervailing duty or "anti-subsidy" law, officials can target imports believed to have been unfairly subsidized by foreign governments; such imports are then subject to an import tax equal in size to the foreign subsidy. Interestingly, the United States never used its countervailing duty law to address imports from Japan over the entire period. 
Treating the symptoms (2): U.S. efforts to improve its exporters' market access in Japan and China
The second strategy a country facing a bilateral trade imbalance due to continued export expansion into its market can use to rebalance concessions is to expand its own exporters' access to the other country's market. The United States has pursued this approach against Japan, and to a lesser extent more recently against China, via a combination of formal trade disputes initiated under the multilateral auspices of the GATT (1955 GATT ( -1994 and WTO (1995 onward) dispute-settlement systems, as well as its unilateral Section 301 law (1974 onward). 31 The USTR website provides a detailed description of U.S. trade preferences for various groups of developing countries: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs.
Under Section 301 of the 1974 U.S. Trade Act, a U.S. export industry can petition the U.S. government to take up its concern that it has lost foreign market access because another country is not living up to a trade agreement it has signed with the United States. 32 Section 301 was strengthened and revitalized in 1988.
U.S. formal market-opening actions against Japan
When Japan joined the GATT in 1955, the country was still very poor. The post-World War II occupation by the United States had only ended in 1952, and Japan's domestic market was not yet attractive to U.S. exporters of manufactured goods. Japan had relied heavily on food imports from the United States and other countries in the immediate postwar period, but as Japanese farmers recovered from the war, the demand for imported food waned. Traditional policies of self-sufficiency began to be restored, and in some cases U.S. food exports were excluded. Thus, early market-opening efforts focused on agricultural products.
By the mid-1970s, the United States had adopted a more formal and legalistic approach to improving its exporters' access to the Japanese market through the combined use of GATT dispute settlement and its Section 301 policy. Over the next twenty years, U.S. officials pursued at least 23 different formal actions against Japan in attempts to open up its market to U.S.
exports. Figure 4 shows formal U.S. market-opening initiatives against Japan and the bilateral U.S. Bhagwati and Patrick (1990) and Bayard and Elliott (1994) . 33 All but one of the Section 301 cases against Japan listed in Table 5 are primarily about a U.S. export industry seeking additional access to the Japanese import market. The one case that does not fall into this category is the 1976 investigation in which Japan and the European Community were accused of colluding in a way that deflected Japanese exports away from the EC import market and toward the U.S. import market.
States initiated. Beginning in 1989, partially out of frustration with the relatively toothless dispute-settlement provisions of the GATT and partially as a negotiating tactic to increase the pressure on the other GATT contracting parties to reform the dispute-settlement provisions, the United States shifted away from using GATT dispute settlement and instead relied solely on its unilateral Section 301 policy tool to pursue cases against Japan. Whereas all but one of the Section 301 investigations against Japan during 1977-1988 resulted in the United States bringing a formal GATT trade dispute, none of the next four Section 301 cases, initiated during 1989-1994, did so. 35 In the WTO era that began in 1995, all U.S. Section 301 investigations of Japan have been forwarded to WTO dispute settlement, along with two other disputes that were not initiated through the Section 301 channel.
As the products in Table 5 indicate, U.S. use of these formal channels to seek additional Japanese market access for its exporters has spanned a considerable range of sectors and issues. In the 1970s, desired market access was primarily in agriculture-based products (tobacco, leather) and lower-value-added manufacturing (silk, cigars, cigarettes, footwear, bats).
In the mid-1980s, while there were continued pressures to obtain Japanese market access for U.S. agricultural products (dairy, legumes, starches, sugars, groundnuts, pineapple, tomato, fish, citrus, and beef) and also wood products, there were new issues of importance to U.S exporters as well. Some of this involved intellectual-property-intensive export products where the United States had a strong comparative advantage (semiconductors, supercomputers, satellites, auto parts), but also involved were issue-areas and disciplines where the GATT rules were only slowly becoming responsive, e.g., trade in services (construction, architectural, engineering) as well as three separate disputes over Japan's government-procurement procedures.
U.S. formal market-opening actions against China
China was one of the original contracting parties to the GATT but withdrew following the communist revolution in 1950. Although China became interested in rejoining (and achieving MFN status) soon after the 1979 commencement of market-oriented reforms and it gained GATT observer status in 1982, it did not resume full-fledged membership in the GATT/WTO 35 The only Section 301 investigation of Japan during 1977-1988 that did not lead to a U.S.-initiated GATT dispute was the semiconductor case initiated in 1985. As noted in section 3.1.1 above, the U.S. domestic industry simultaneously filed antidumping petitions against Japanese exports, which led to the negotiation of voluntary export restraints and ultimately the bilateral semiconductor agreements. Under these agreements, Japan promised to undertake "voluntary import expansions" to increase semiconductor imports from U.S. exporters. This in turn led to two formal GATT disputes. The EC initiated a dispute against Japan in 1987, alleging that its agreement with the United States discriminated against EC exporters. Japan initiated a dispute against the United States in 1987 after the United States retaliated by raising tariffs against Japan for its failure to live up to the terms of the bilateral semiconductor agreement.
system until 2001. Perhaps learning from their experience with Japan and other countries that had adopted export-led growth strategies, WTO members made China's reentry conditional on many special provisions. These included some China-specific safeguards allowing members to impose "temporary" discriminatory restrictions on Chinese exports and others requiring China to comply over time with a variety of multilateral commitments.
Moreover, the United States and other WTO members demanded many more import market-access commitments when they negotiated the terms of China's accession to the WTO than had previously been the case with new arrivals. 36 When China acceded to the WTO in 2001, it had cut tariffs significantly on a broad range of products, making its applied tariffs both relatively low and quite close to the bound rates. As Table 6 indicates, China's applied and bound tariffs in 2007 were only slightly higher than those of the United States and Japan overall and actually lower than Japan's in certain areas (e.g., agriculture). China's tariffs were also much lower on average than those of other major emerging economies such as India and Brazil, countries that have been part of the GATT/WTO system for decades longer than China.
But as Figure 5 shows, the U.S. bilateral trade deficit has nonetheless been expanding 36 When the WTO was created in the Uruguay Round, many less-developed countries were permitted to join without special conditions. Other transition economies joined prior to China or around the same time without special conditions. China's "special" treatment was presumably a consequence of its already evident potential for significant global impact as an exporter. 
Attempts to address systemic issues through new GATT/WTO disciplines
In addition to efforts to provide "symptomatic relief" for the large bilateral imbalances via U.S.
import restrictions and export promotion, U.S. policy makers also undertook actions to address what they perceived as important underlying causes of the persistent imbalances. In this section we describe these underlying causes (as portrayed by U.S. officials and the U.S. public at large) 38 Indeed, the shift toward U.S. use of countervailing duty policy against China described above and illustrated in Table 3 may reflect the U.S. desire to speed the elimination of China's domestic subsidy programs, which increase China's ability to export while reducing foreign access to China's domestic market. 39 During the period of general U.S. emphasis on use of Section 301 (1988-1994) described above in the context of our discussion of Japan, the USTR also initiated three separate Section 301 investigations of China between 1991 and 1994. Two of these investigations related to intellectual property rights, while one concerned general conditions of China's import market access that were alleged to impose barriers via quantitative restrictions, burdensome licensing procedures, technical barriers, and lack of transparency. For a discussion, see Bayard and Elliott (1994, Appendix and the consequences for the international trading system of U.S. efforts to address those causes.
As we describe in sections 5.1 and 5.2, a common view in the United States during both episodes was that inappropriate foreign government interference with market forces lay at the root of the imbalances. This perception led naturally to U.S. efforts to use (and modify) the rules-based trading system to address the troubling imbalances in a systematic way. The differences in the bilateral imbalance that the United States faced with Japan versus its bilateral problem with China are found in the details. Finally, section 5.3 discusses some unintended consequences of the evolution of the trading system from the perspective of the United Statesin particular, how Japan and China have used the WTO dispute-settlement process to selfenforce their exporters' access to the U.S. market.
U.S.-Japan conflict and the reach of WTO disciplines
U.S. priorities in the Uruguay Round were shaped by dissatisfaction arising from U.S. exporters' inability over several decades to access certain export markets, especially that of Japan. This is clearly reflected in Table 5 , which lists the exported products and disciplines at the heart of the formal actions (Section 301 and GATT disputes) the United States initiated against Japan during the 1977-1994 period.
In the Uruguay Round, the United States sought to negotiate more rules and greater transparency, as well as extending disciplines in areas such as "standards" (including the We have already seen some of the results in the context of our discussion of WTO disputes brought by the United States against Japan since 1995 ( 
U.S.-China conflict and the reach of WTO disciplines
Perhaps the most fundamental issue raised by China's entry is its legacy as a centrally planned economy. Although industrial policy has now been decentralized to a significant extent, explicit and implicit subsidies remain an integral part of the nation's industrial policy. Under the terms of its accession agreement it is still accorded non-market-economy (NME) status, which in practice has translated into huge dumping margins and anti-dumping duties. Along with remaining cash subsidies and tax rebates, China continues to provide financial support to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), easy access to loans for preferred companies and sectors, administrative guidance favoring FDI in preferred sectors, as well as persistent exchange-rate undervaluation (with the effect of protecting all domestic producers from competing imports and subsidizing all exporters).
Current trade rules cover explicit cash subsidies and some tax rebates, but the protected status of SOEs and governmental discretion in the allocation of financial capital have parallels in the policies and practice of many other member countries. WTO disciplines regarding traderelated investment are weak at best, and the WTO has no explicit (actionable) mechanisms for dealing with a country's manipulation of its exchange rate as an implicit means of favoring national firms over their foreign rivals in domestic or export markets.
With the opportunity to negotiate the terms of China's entry into the WTO, countries that had already attained membership were able to extract massive accession commitments from China. These included commitments by China to scaling back explicit subsidies to SOEs and reforming the banking sector. However, given the self-enforcing nature of the WTO system, other members must enforce China's commitment to reining in subsidies by initiating formal WTO complaints under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Moreover, since there is no explicit WTO mechanism for dealing with the issue of implicit subsidization via currency undervaluation, even countries seeking to contest China's explicit subsides through the DSU must resort to other policy options to confront the currency issue.
WTO members have used two approaches to confront the China subsidy problem. The first, used by the United States, is to initiate anti-subsidy disputes at the WTO (see Table 7 ).
Through 2008, China has settled every WTO dispute over subsidies with a promise to remove the allegedly WTO-inconsistent measure. The only exception is the "Famous Brands" case, which was initiated only in December 2008. 41 The alternative way to contest China's use of subsidies is for affected countries to facilitate use by their domestic firms of the country's own countervailing duty law. There is evidence (see Table 3 ) that WTO members including the United State are using this second route. Table 8 shows how Japan has used WTO (and GATT) dispute settlement against the United States. While Japan rarely used formal dispute settlement against the United States during the GATT era, it has been much more active during the WTO period. The clear focus of Japan's WTO trade dispute efforts has been on reforming U.S. use of antidumping. This is not surprising, given that Uruguay Round negotiators failed to agree on new rules to discipline use of antidumping. 43 Japan has filed disputes over U.S. imposition of antidumping measures on specific Japanese exports, e.g., hot rolled steel. Japan also challenged the little-used "other" U.S. antidumping law (Antidumping Act of 1916) as WTO-inconsistent because it allows for punitive damages beyond the imposition of ad valorem duties, and Japan joined the collective challenge to the U.S. Byrd Amendment, which required antidumping duties collected from 41 Perhaps in preparation for the possibility that the parties to a future dispute are unable to negotiate a settlement and the dispute goes to WTO adjudication, Chinese officials are becoming well informed on WTO rules and case law regarding subsidies and countervailing measures. As Bown (forthcoming , Table  10 ) indicates, China has been closely following the evolution of WTO rulings on subsidies in other countries' disputes. As of early 2009, China had participated as an "interested third party" in over a dozen formal WTO disputes involving other countries' subsidy issues. 42 See the discussion in Bown (2002a) . While VERs are banned under the Agreement on Safeguards, they are implicitly encouraged elsewhere in the WTO Agreements, e.g., through encouragement of "price undertakings" by targeted exporting firms in investigations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement. Moreover, because the WTO is a self-enforcing system, VERs can still be negotiated provided that no member complains. Because in many instances the exporting country is better off under a VER than under the likely alternative (usually a higher import duty levied under some other policy), there may be no "party" (member) to complain. Consumers of the affected imports and taxpayers in the importing country are likely to lose, but they have no direct standing in the WTO system. 43 One consequence of the failure of the United States and other WTO members to address AD reform is that the use of AD has proliferated globally across the WTO membership. Indeed, the most frequent users of antidumping are now developing countries, with other developing country exporters, especially China, a frequent target.
New rules and the ability of Japan and
foreign firms to be refunded to the domestic U.S. firms behind the antidumping petition. Japan has also challenged the Department of Commerce's use of "zeroing" to inflate dumping margins and thus justify higher antidumping duties. 44 Finally, Japan challenged the way in which the United States conducts its "sunset reviews." These reviews are supposed to lead to the removal of the imposed antidumping duties after five years, but in most instances U.S. duties have remained in place well beyond the five-year limit. Table 8 indicates that China has also been using WTO dispute settlement as a complainant since its accession. China's approach been similar to that of Japan, but its activity has been more limited. On the complainant side, China's only involvement in a formal dispute prior to 2007 was the challenge it joined with Japan, the EC, and six other WTO members seeking removal of the steel safeguard import restrictions imposed by the United States in 2002.
Since 2007, however, China has begun to challenge U.S. use of antidumping and countervailing duty policies. The first dispute China initiated against the United States (after the imposition of a preliminary duty) became moot after the USITC found no evidence of injury, and so no final duties were imposed, as discussed section 3.3 above. But in response to increasing U.S. antidumping activity (Figures 2 and 3b ) and the new U.S. stance on countervailing duty use (Table 3) , in 2008 China initiated a challenge to the U.S. laws in the first four instances in which China's exporters were targeted with U.S. CVD. In April 2009, China initiated its first challenge to trade barriers over a standards issue, questioning whether the U.S. ban on poultry imports from China could be justified scientifically.
Macroeconomic roots of trade frictions
In previous sections we have focused mainly on U.S. trade policy responses at the industry or product level, and also U.S. efforts to address certain systemic features of the partner economy, especially industrial policy and exchange-rate undervaluation, that are widely believed to confer an artificial competitive advantage relative to U.S. firms. In this section, we examine the trade imbalances from a macroeconomic perspective, and we indicate similarities and differences for the cases of Japan and China. Insights from the macroeconomic roots of the imbalance help to explain how imbalance episodes develop and also why they end.
The macroeconomic analysis begins from the accounting identity that a nation's currentaccount balance must be equal to the difference between the nation's saving and its domestic investment. 45 Equivalently, a nation's current-account balance must be equal to the difference between its domestic production and its total domestic spending for goods and servicesconsumption, domestic investment, and government. Any shortfall must be matched by an equal net capital inflow from abroad. Roughly speaking, the country's ability to "live beyond its means" in a particular year must be financed through borrowing from abroad. 46 Likewise, a country with a current-account surplus must have saving that exceeds its domestic investment and thus makes a net addition to national holdings of foreign assets.
An identity is simply a relationship that must hold at all times; it is not a theory that relates cause and effect. In practice, many economic variables can adjust simultaneously to maintain the relationship described by the identity. These include not only the components of the identity but also variables that influence them, such as interest rates, exchange rates, and capital-market development. Moreover, if a new policy changes one variable directly, other induced changes may offset its impact. For example, if a country attempts to improve its trade balance only by raising all tariffs on imports, thus reducing imports, induced changes might include an exchange-rate appreciation, which would in turn encourage imports and reduce exports. But the identity does show how the external imbalance relates to aggregates in the domestic economy, and particularly national saving. No set of policies can reduce the U.S.
current-account deficit unless they result in higher national saving, lower domestic investment, or both.
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A country's saving consists of two parts: private saving and government (public) saving; government saving is equal to the fiscal surplus or deficit. Private saving in turn consists of household saving and corporate saving. This decomposition is significant because the growth of U.S. current-account and trade deficits have occurred in tandem with rapid declines in U.S.
national saving. But although U.S. saving dropped during both periods of bilateral conflict, the causes of the two drops were different. 48 In the 1980s, the growth of the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Japan occurred during a period when the federal budget deficit was also growing, the current-account balance. In practice, movements in the U.S. merchandise trade balance (our main focus elsewhere in this paper) are closely linked to movements in the current account. 46 More precisely, foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets in that year must exceed U.S. residents' acquisitions of foreign assets. However, equities and similar ownership claims do not reflect borrowing and lending. For example, "foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets" can include greenfield construction of new foreignowned manufacturing facilities in the United States or sale of an interest in an existing U.S. business to foreign investors. The statement may also be misleading in implying that it is international borrowing that must adjust to cover the gap between domestic production and domestic demand for goods and services. His empirical analysis confirms a significant causal role of budget balances in determining current-account imbalances. However, he also concludes that the Japanese current-account surpluses of the 1980s were driven by underperformance of investment rather than over-saving.
48 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 5 .1, shows the decomposition for each quarter of U.S. saving into private saving and government saving.
i.e., government saving was falling. This is the situation often described as the "twin deficits."
However, the ballooning U.S. Throughout the paper, we have focused on bilateral imbalances. In a world of many countries, a U.S. saving-investment gap must be matched by a U.S. current-account deficit with the rest of the world as a whole. Since the early 1990s, the United States has had a deficit on goods trade with most global regions, not only with Japan and China (see Figure 5) . Mann (2004) terms the alignment of U.S. and foreign structural characteristics and policy choices during this period "global co-dependency"-with the United States increasingly serving as a "buyer of last resort" for producers throughout the world. 49 How the resulting overall U.S. trade deficit is divided across particular trading partners depends on other countries' own macroeconomic relationships, as well as the countries' exchange rates relative to the dollar and comparative advantages relative to the United States. A necessary condition for a large bilateral deficit is a saving shortfall relative to domestic investment in the United States together with a corresponding savings surplus in the partner country. Both Japan and China (as well as smaller East Asian countries) have high saving rates, and both have overall current-account surpluses, i.e., they are net purchasers of foreign assets. Thus, we can also think of a given partner's net saving financing U.S. spending (private or government) through purchases of U.S.
assets. In fact, both Japan and China have accumulated large quantities of U.S. assets, including but not limited to U.S. government securities, in both cases helping to maintain a currency that many considered "undervalued" relative to the dollar.
One interesting comparison that cannot yet be completed concerns the ends of the two episodes. Japan-bashing was moderated by the rapid appreciation of the yen relative to the dollar that began in 1985 and slowed to a crawl during Japan's "lost decade" in the 1990s. 
Conclusions
A goal of this paper is to provide a framework that allows us to make sense of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China trade relationships over the past thirty years, seeing similarities and differences as well as implications for evolution of the rules-based GATT/WTO system. The central similarity in the two bilateral relationships is the huge bilateral trade imbalance, a reflection of the outward-oriented growth strategy followed by Japan and China but also of underlying macroeconomic conditions. In both cases, the result has been a strain on the reciprocity-based trading system. We have looked at the imbalance as the result of exports that grew "too fast" from the U.S. perspective and imports that grew "too slowly." In both cases, the U.S. public and government officials chose to interpret the imbalance as a symptom of non-market considerations; in both cases, the official response included both policies that addressed the symptoms as well as efforts to remedy features of the partner economy that were perceived as underlying causes. But in both cases the U.S. public and government officials were slow to 50 The full export price of these goods is reflected in the statistics on U.S.-China trade even when Chinese value-added is only a fraction of this price.
acknowledge an underlying cause at home: the very low U.S. saving rate and a resulting domestic macroeconomic imbalance that translated into a large external imbalance.
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On the import side, the two cases are similar in the U.S. resort to VERs and antidumping, as well as negotiation of preferential agreements with traditional suppliers of relevant imported products. One difference is that the United States has recently begun using countervailing duties against China, an approach it did not take with Japan. Another difference is the use of the China-specific safeguards negotiated when China joined the WTO.
On the export side, use of U.S. Section 301 and GATT dispute settlement against Japan in the 1977-1994 period looks similar to the use of WTO dispute settlement against China since 2006. Differences are more subtle; consistent with a political-economy perspective, U.S. efforts in both cases reflected dominant export interests at the time. In the case of Japan, the role of keiretsu and active industrial policy were seen as an important part of the problem. In the case of China, the legacy of a non-market system has remained an issue, even though an increasing share of import-competing products and exports has come from parts of the economy where private ownership and market forces are strong.
U.S. frustration with its lack of success in prying open the Japanese market led to new rules introduced into the WTO system (SPS, TBT, Government Procurement, Information
Technology, TRIPS, Agriculture) in the Uruguay Round negotiations. The most important change, however, was the introduction of a new system of dispute resolution with "teeth,"
though this required the United States to modify the aggressive unilateralism that had characterized its approach to trade policy in the pre-WTO period. As we have noted, no progress has been made on antidumping, although the improved dispute-settlement system may help to address this problem over time.
Looking ahead to new issues, prospects for global negotiations are now dominated by two issues that overshadow the ones that constituted the Doha Round agenda as well as others that have vied for public attention most recently (e.g., contaminated foods, unsafe toys). One major new issue is the global recession, with the associated decline in the volume of world trade and the rise of new protectionism. The second is climate change and the trade-policy implications of efforts to limit carbon emissions-and to deal with "carbon leakage" from countries not willing to join in these efforts. China in particular has already been the major target of a surge of WTO-legal administered protection and is likely also to be a major target of 52 Because of China's heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants, most analysts have assumed China will lag wealthier trading partners in efforts to limit carbon omissions and that border measures associated with a new global regime would therefore reduce the international competitiveness of Chinese exports. However, China has recently taken the world lead in building coal-fired power plants that are efficient and less polluting (Bradsher 2009) and has also moved forward rapidly with wind and nuclear power generation. By mastering clean technologies and driving down costs, China may emerge as a major exporter of the environmental capital goods needed to implement ambitious goals regarding carbon emissions. Notes: *Earliest year of initiation of formal Section 301 petition or GATT/WTO dispute. **Not a GATT dispute initiated under Article XXIII, but a dispute documented in Hudec (1993) . †U.S. retaliation or threatened retaliation led to Japan filing a GATT/WTO trade dispute against the U.S. Sources: Section 301, GATT, and WTO dispute initiation data compiled by the authors as described in Table 5 . U.S.-Japan bilateral trade data from Feenstra et al. (2005) .
